Long-term problems: anemic inflation, the business of banking, poor productivity, and the damage of the neoliberal paradigm
The “four forces” weighing down economic growth, unfortunately, are "short term" issues for the BIS. Here's the thing, inflation remains anemic despite the levels advanced economies are experiencing, overall. What's more, even though inflation has been getting close to the "economic potential" identified by central banks, it's sketchy at best. Record-low unemployment has made inflation data even more perplexing. So, it's here where things get a little spooky in the annual report:
Much ink has been spilt over this surprising development [anemic inflation]. Some, like us, have for a long time stressed globalisation and technological advances. In addition, demographics-induced changes in the labour force may have led to underestimates of economic slack. What is clear is that labour has been struggling to regain the bargaining power lost over the past decades. And while wages have finally been responding more clearly to tighter labour markets, firms have shown little sign of reacquiring pricing power.
Well, yeah. Overall, wages have been riding at a better clip than productivity, but maybe prices haven't gone up on goods due to the levels of debt consumers are carrying around, and maybe it’s due to the fact that many consumers have issues with access to credit and/or low asset values against that which to borrow and spend further. Then they wrote:
Less appreciated is the fact that ever since inflation has been low and stable, starting some three decades ago, the nature of business fluctuations has changed. Until then, it was sharply rising inflation, and the subsequent monetary policy tightening, that ushered in downturns. Since then, financial expansions and contractions have played a more prominent role.
I'm glad they finally realized this, because if you line-up inflation (CPI), nominal GDP, longer-term interest rates (like the 10-year treasury yield), and the central bank rate (such as the federal funds rate), the patterns are very clear. All that is left is to explore the relationship between these and other variables. I have begun exploring this publicly with you, my readers. See
this article, for example, where I breakdown the relationship between interest rates and nominal GDP.
Which brings us to the second force: finance and its role in the economy. The GFC [Great Financial Crisis] was just the most spectacular instance of this role. This justifies the greater attention policymakers now pay to financial markets, credit developments and real estate prices...Perhaps the forces that can be explored in more depth are finance and the inflation process... In many of the countries less affected by the GFC, financial expansions have reached an inflexion point. As a group, these economies account for around one third of global GDP. Private sector credit growth has slowed relative to GDP and, in a number of cases, property prices have started to fall. After the strong credit expansion, these countries are now saddled with historically high household debt levels, and some with high corporate debt as well.
Exactly! I really hope this is a call-to-action, because, as we know, the role of credit creation, not necessarily interest rates, cannot be understated. After all, banks and those who fall under the BIS's "finance" label are pivotal in creating or destroying wealth in whatever markets this creating and destroying takes place.
The condition of the banking sector is, in some respects, paradoxical. Country differences aside, it is much better capitalised thanks to the post-crisis regulatory reforms. However, asset growth among the major banks has slowed sharply since the GFC. Book equity growth has been similarly lacklustre. The slow growth of book equity reflects, in part, banks’ chronically low profitability, particularly in many euro area countries. This matters. Profits are the first line of defence against losses and, as by far the primary source of capital, they are the foundation for banks’ ability to lend and support the economy. Some of the reasons for low profitability can be traced to legacies from the GFC and the macroeconomic environment, most notably persistently and unusually low nominal interest rates. Others reflect more structural factors, especially excess capacity in a number of key banking systems.
This “paradoxical” condition of banking is not as paradoxical as the BIS is making it out to be: regulation for European banks, like Basel I, II, and III, force banks to raise capitalization requirements, or the amount of money banks need to lend money. So, yeah, if you force the banks to have higher capital ratios, then you will inevitably get banks that experience better equity growth (after the ones who don’t find capital go bust), but asset growth (loans) will continue to struggle. And from there, profits will struggle, because banks don’t make money on equity, they make money lending fountain pen money.
Banks subject to tight capitalization requirements will eventually turn around and go somewhere else where they can lend more freely. It has nothing to do with nominal interest rates. If banks are restricted by capital ratios, they will go conservative and leave many potential and current borrowers in the dark. Maybe it’s telling, but capitalization requirements in Europe and elsewhere have enabled a boom-loop where credit freezes, rather than proliferates. Lowering interest rates to zero and beyond will not offset the tight noose.
The third force is productivity growth, or rather the lack thereof. Growth accelerations of the type experienced in 2017 could only lead to sustained growth at a new, higher pace if a level shift in productivity growth takes place. Productivity growth has been on a marked downward trend in advanced economies as a group for a long time. And the slowdown became more marked following the GFC. The impaired financial system is likely to have played a role in impeding the allocation of resources to their best use. And it is surely no coincidence that trade has lagged behind output and that investment has been correspondingly weak. Whatever the actual reasons, lower productivity growth is constraining sustainable expansions, at least in the advanced economies, where the frontier for the rest of the world is set.
Ah, and if you haven't realized this already, the productivity puzzle is essential to achieving sustainable economic growth. Central banks cannot fix this problem with their current tools- their institution was never designed or intended to do this job. But you know who can? The commanding heights… the banks, various smaller lenders, and so on. Anything with a banking license.
Finally, the fourth issue is the fallout or "political and social backlash" against the "open international economic order." Or, as some would call it, the "neoliberal paradigm." As we know, this backlash has come in the form of populism, extremist right and left-leaning politics, protectionism, you name it. The result? Donald Trump, restrictive trade policies, erosion of rights and legal protections, and even political censorship. The BIS is worried about the hangover of the neoliberal paradigm. One form this hangover is rearing its ugly head within? Big tech firms:
Looking ahead, a looming competitive threat to banks comes in the form of the big techs...these huge companies that have started making inroads in financial services, leveraging the vast customer bases they have secured through their activities (eg social media, e-commerce and search engines). Payments, retail lending, asset management and even insurance have already seen deep incursions by these behemoths, whose market capitalisation far exceeds that of banks...They represent a wake-up call for banks, which need to raise their game in order to compete effectively.
One might ask: how could a large tech company like Facebook or Google seriously compete with banks? One way is for these firms to get their hands on banking licenses. Otherwise, they're not really a threat. On the other hand, if folks move away from banks and debt-induced existence even slightly, then economies around the world are going to face some serious threats. You see, economic growth and total bank assets (total loans) are heavily correlated. So, if people voluntarily move away from banks and jump into big tech's lap, it might be good for a while, but it will eventually get ugly. This is perhaps the biggest challenge for the banks, indeed; and one that all got under way during the neoliberal paradigm.